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OFF-FARM INCOME AND INVESTMENTS IN FARM ASSETS: A 
DOUBLE-HURDLE APPROACH 
 








The farm household encompasses a complex set of inter-relationships between and among a 
variety of internal and external factors involving consumption, investment, and income-earning 
activities.  For example, farm households today receive a substantial part of their income from 
non-farm sources such as wage and salary jobs and non-farm businesses. In the U.S., for example, 
income from off-farm sources accounted for 90% of the total income for farm households in 1999 
(USDA-ERS, Mishra et al, 2002).  
 
Other studies documenting the importance of off-farm income are Fuller (1991), Huffman (1991) 
and Weiss (1999). The picture remains the same if part-time farm households are defined on the 
basis of time spent in farming. In a study of off-farm employment in Austria, Weiss (1997) 
estimates that on more than 50% of farms, the husband and wife work less than 50% of their 
working time on the farm. 
 
These findings may seem surprising since it is generally presumed that full-time farm 
operations are more efficient than part-time farms. Full-time operations have the 
advantage of scale efficient technology and lower costs of credit. This led Cochrane to 
comment, “…most [part-time farms] are going to bite the dust…cannibalized by their 
larger, aggressive, innovative neighbors” (Cochrane, 1987). However, there is little   4 
evidence that this is happening. Instead, studies indicate that mid-sized farms are 
squeezed out as the size structure of farms settles to a bi-modal distribution where farms 
are either large full-time operations or small part-time activities (Weiss, 1999). 
In general, off-farm work has provided a mechanism for maintaining income parity with 
other groups in the society (Gardner, 1992). Gardner (2005) also notes that the 
integration of farm and nonfarm labor markets has slowed the overall rate of decline in 
the number of farms. Now many people are commuting to nonfarm jobs while they 
remain living on the farm. Furthermore, according to Gardner, small farms are 
flourishing to an extent that no one guessed 20 or 30 years ago. Presumably, off-farm 
income has contributed to reducing the riskiness of the income stream facing the farm 
household. However, if part-time farms are less economically efficient, then lower rates of 




The literature on the optimal capital structure of farm businesses and households is extensive.  
Factors affecting optimal capital structure include depreciation, taxes, investment tax credits, 
economies of scale, wealth, and adjustment costs (Ahrendsen et al.; Barry et al.,2000); the cost of 
debt capital, asymmetric information problems, agency costs, adverse selection, moral hazard 
(Barry et al. 2000; Zhao, Barry, and Katchova, 2008); credit constraints (Featherstone, 2005; 
Bierlen et al.,1998); financing costs (Zhao, Barry, and Katchkova, 2008); lender-borrower 
relationships (Turvey and Weersink, 1997); consumption (Weber, 2002; Mishra, et. al., 2002); 
life-cycle model of the farm household (Mishra, et. al., 2002; Phimister, 1995); signaling, pecking 
order, and trade-off theories (Zhao, Barry and Katchova, 2008); transaction costs and risk aversion 
(Juiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese, 1996; Benjamin and Phimister, 1997; Robison, Barry and 
Burghardt, 1987);  specialization (Purdy, Langemeier, and Featherstone, 1997); tenure position   5 
(Ellinger and Barry, 1987) and leasing (Boumtje, Barry, and Ellinger, 2001), off-farm work 
(Lagerkvist, Larsen, and Olson, 2007); risk balancing (Collins, 1985; Yan Yan, Katchova, and 
Barry, 2004); diversification, age, education, type of farm, gross farm income, amount of debt, 
return on assets, and government payments (Katchova, 2005).  
 
Several off farm employment studies have been conducted.  Some studies indicate a life cycle 
effect for off-farm employment which suggests that individuals will increase their work efforts in 
their younger years to accumulate wealth to draw on in later life (Huffman ,1980; Sumner 1998).  
Previous studies have also suggested that older farm operators may be less likely to work off farm, 
which may suggest differences in attitudes regarding work that are correlated with age (Mishra 
and Goodwin, 1998). Many researchers suggest that the larger the farm, the lower the probability 
that farmers work off the farm (Mishra and Goodwin, 1998).  However, Mishra et al (2002) found 
that the operator and spouse often pursued dual careers even in households operating large farms. 
Hennessy and O‟Brien (2005) found that farm characteristics such as system, size, and 
profitability are important factors affecting farm investment.  However, they were led to reject the 
theory that income drives farm investment.  
 
 
The Relationship Between Off-farm Income and Farm Investment 
There are a number of economic theories as to why off-farm income may affect farm 
investment (O‟Brien and Hennessy, 2005). The agricultural household production model 
 suggests that it is economically rational for farmers that work off the farm to invest in farming if 
the farm investment allows them to maintain or increase farm output with less farm labor. In 
effect, farmers that work off the farm may maximize their total income by using some 
of their off-farm income to invest in the farm. The presence of off-farm   6 
income may also relax the budget constraints in the farm household. Farm households 
that depend only on farm income have to use a larger proportion of farm profit to 
satisfy the consumption demands of the household. In households where additional 
income is present, the budgetary constraints are relaxed thereby making more of the 
farm profit available for reinvestment. 
 
A number of previous studies have investigated these theories. Rosenzweig and 
Wolpin (1993) and Ahituv and Kimhi (2000) found that a substitution effect exists 
between farm labor and capital, where farmers working off-farm substitute capital for 
labor as capital deepening releases labor from farm production. Upton and Haworth 
(1987) examined the growth of farms in the UK using Farm Business Survey data. They 
found evidence to support a positive relationship between farm growth and off-farm 
income, thereby suggesting that farmers with higher levels of off-farm income were 
more likely to grow their farms through investment. These studies suggest that there 
may be a positive relationship between farm investment and off-farm income. 
However, the reverse can also be argued and supported with empirical evidence. 
 
The transition from full-time to part-time farming can often be perceived as a first step 
out of farming and therefore farmers that work off the farm might not be expected to 
reinvest in farming. A number of studies, as reviewed by Hennessy and Rehman 
(2008), show that farmers that work off the farm typically operate more extensive and 
less profitable farms. Glauben et al (2003) conducted a review of studies that 
investigated these issues. They cite a number of studies that presented empirical 
evidence that farmers that work off the farm have lower expectations of continuing 
the farm business, are less likely to have a successor and as a consequence are less   7 
likely to invest in their farms. It follows then that farmers that work off the farm may 
be less likely to reinvest in the farm business. Furthermore, a study conducted by Anderson et al 
(2005) using farm data from the US shows that an increase in off-farm income increases the 
investment in non-farm assets relative to farm assets. 
 
It seems that there are conflicting theories about the relationship between off-farm 
income and farm investment. On the other hand, farmers that work off the farm may 
choose to substitute capital for labor thus increasing farm investment. Furthermore, 
the presence of off-farm income in the household, earned by either farmer or spouse, 
may “free-up” more capital for reinvestment in the business. On the other hand 
however, farmers that work off the farm seem typically to operate less profitable, less 
intensive farms and therefore may be less likely to reinvest in a business that may 
provide a poor return. 
 
In this paper we use ARMS data to explore the contribution of off-farm income to the viability of 
the farm business.  We focus on the link between off-farm income and farm investment and 
whether off-farm income drives on-farm investment.  
 
Modelling the Investment Decision 
The investment decision can be viwed as a binary one, i.e. to invest or not, and thus can be 
analyzed using a dichotomous choice probit model. However, farmers are also faced with the 
decision of how much to invest.  Modelling both decisions together is more desirable since such a 
model would provide information about who invests and how much.  Estimating just the level of 
investment ignores the potential extra information in the data about who actually invests. One 
approach is to estimate the first decision using probit and the second stage using tobit.  However,   8 
employing a choice model assumes that a farm can either choose to invest or not.  A choice model 
is no longer appropriate if the farm has no money to invest. We apply the double-hurdle model in 
our analysis to minimize these problems. The first hurdle is based on whether farmers invest in 
their operations and the second hurdle models the decision on the amount of farm investment.  The 
model is estimated using ARMS data for 1999 and 2008. The ARMS collects detailed 
information on farming activities.  
 
The double-hurdle model, originally formulated by Cragg (1971), assumes that two hurdles are 
involved in the process of investment decisions, each of which can be determined by a different 
set of explanatory variables. In order to observe a positive level of investment, two separate 
hurdles must be passed. A different latent variable is used to model each decision process,  
 
*
1 i y  = wi 
„α + vi investment decision  
*
2 i y = xi 
„ β + ui  level of investment  
yi = xi'β + ui    if y
* i1 > 0 and y
* i2 > 0 
 
yi = 0   otherwise 
 
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The ARMS is a rich data source which allows the exploration of cross-sectional data  over several 
years.  Unlike most previous studies, the sample provides an accurate estimate of debt usage by 
farm households across all regions, farm types, and operator demographics, by year. 
For this study we use two cross-sections of the USDA farm-level ARMS data -- 1999 and 2008. 
The descriptive statistics are shown in table 2. 
 
Results   9 
The estimated coefficients, the marginal effects (the effect of a unit change in each explanatory on 
the probability of investing) and the level of capital expenditure for the double hurdle model are 
shown in table 3.   
 
Operator age was not found to significantly affect the decision to invest or the level of capital 
expenditures.  This is surprising since previous studies cite a life cycle effect, where the 
probability of investment increases with age as younger farmers grow their businesses, and then 
declines with age as older farmers near retirement (O‟Brien and Hennessy, 2005). 
 
The results also indicate that farm size (gvsales) is a significant factor influencing both the 
probability of investment and the level of capital expenditures in 2008. The positive, significant 
value indicates that as farms increase in size, they require larger levels of capital expenditures. 
Education has varied effects in 2008—a college education reduces the level of capital 
expenditures and a postgraduate degree reduces the probability of farm investment.  This might 
suggest that highly educated farm operators may be using higher off farm incomes to finance farm 
investment or substitute higher off farm income for farm income. 
 
The level of farm diversity (entropy) is significant and positive for both the stages of the double 
hurdle model in 2008. The coefficient is negative and significant.  As the level of diversification 
increases, the level of risk decreases.  This reduces the level of investment since positive 
investment would increase overall risk.  The level of vertical integration is also positive in the 
second stage for 2008.  Higher levels of contracting create higher levels of investment since risk is 
reduced under contracts or is needed to continue securing contracts. 
   10 
The main hypothesis being examined is the link between off farm income and farm investment.  
Total farm income (totofi) was significant and negative in the first stage for both 1999 and 2008.  
The variable was positive and insignificant in the second stage for both 1999 and 2008.  
Apparently, the presence of off-farm income reduces the probability of investing in the farm and 
does not increase the level of investment in the second stage.  Therefore, we cannot conclude that 
off-farm income is driving farm investments.  
 
Conclusions 
The results indicate the importance of farm characteristics such as type, size, and location on the 
probability of investment but lead us to reject the hypothesis that off farm income is driving farm 
investment.  Further research will be need to further unweave some of the complex relationships 
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Source: Parmiter, Irene, Off Farm Income and Practice, Technical Paper 97/5, Ministry 
             Of Agriculture, New Zealand, June 1997.   16 
Table 1. Variable Descriptions 
 
Variable  Units  Description 
     
Invest  1=yes; else=0  Farm capital expenditures 
Expenditures  Dollars  Farm capital expenditures 
College  1=college; else=0  Education (finished degree) 
Postgraduate  1=postgraduate; else=0  Education (beyond four year degree) 
Op_age  Years  Age of farm operator 
Fowner  1=full owner; else=0  Farm ownership 
Gvsales1  Thousand dollars  Gross value of farm sales 





Receives government payments 
Off farm employment 
Totofi  Dollars  Off farm income 
Ratioasst  Ratio  Ratio of farm assets to household assets 
Lakestates  1= Lakestates; else=0  Region 
Cornbelt  1=Corn Belt; else=0  Region  
Nplains  1=Northern Plains; else=0  Region 
Delta  1=Delta: else=0  Region  
Mountain  1=Mountain; else=0  Region  
Indexverticalintegration  Ratio of contract sales/total 
sales 
Level of vertical integration 
Dairyfarm  1=dairy farm;  else=0  Type of farm 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
   17 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
         
  2008                                                              1999 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev  Mean  Std. Dev 
Invest 









College  0.2583  0.4377  0.2433  0.4291 
Postgraduate  0.2386  0.4662  0.1358  0.3426 
Op_age  57.6768  13.1719  54.7675  13.5794 
Fowner  0.6573  0.4746  0.5811  0.4934 
Gvsales1  120691.9  645247.7  71465.63  448119.8 











Totofi       70692.36  117452.0  57962.55  92725.46 
Ratioasst  32.4388  30.5036  31.9602  197.869 
Lakestates  0.1029  0.3038  0.0711  2571.0 
Cornbelt  0.1816  0.3855  0.1956  0.3967 
Nplains  0.0570  0.2319  0.0597  0.2369 
Delta  0.0544  0.2267  0.0557  0.2294 
Mountain  0.1097  0.3125  0.1036  0.3048 
Indexverticalintegration  0.0905  0.3490  0.0758  0.2434 
Dairyfarm  0.0264  0.1603  0.0422  0.2100 
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Table 3. Double Hurdle Results 
            2008                  1999 
          
First Hurdle     
Constant  4.26***  3.72 
College  1.06  -1.30 
Postgrad  -0.96**  -1.22 
Op_age  -0.02  -0.005 
Fowner  -2.74***  -0.16 
Gvsales1  0.010*  0.04 
Entrophy  -36.27*  0.88 
Getgovtpayments  -0.41  -0.17 
Workofffarm  0.010  -2.67*** 
Ratioasst  -0.0001***  0.67* 
Lakestates  8.07***  0.42 
Cornbelt  2.89***  3.43*** 
Nplains  10.24***  7.50*** 
Delta  4.12  3.02* 
Mountain  0.61  1.60 
Indexverticalintegration  -0.07  0.79 
Dairyfarm  6.31***  -6.82*** 
Totofi  -0.002***  -0.00006** 
 
 
   
Second hurdle     
Constant  -157490.40***  -197297.90*** 
College  -15578.66**  -1287.32 
Postgrad  -2630.75  -1180.12 
Op_age  -41.27  424.99 
Fowner  5739.95  6315.32 
Gvsales1  7.38***  1.52 
Entrophy  -1978478***  84694.54** 
Getgovtpayments  23296.53***  22563.78** 
Totofi  83.87  0.50 
Ratioasst  1.35  1.79 
Lakestates  88412.81***  -3342.64 
Cornbelt  115238.80***  98991.46*** 
Nplains  62515.69***  64125.42*** 
Delta  58989.94***  51245.63*** 
Mountain  72196.68***  58867.88*** 
Indexverticalintegration  33819.83*  -22920.73* 










***=99% significance; **=95% significance; *=90% significance  19 
 
          Table 4. Marginal effects 
 
Variable  2008  2008  1999  1999 
  Probability  Expenditure  Probability  Expenditure 
         
College  -0.387  -11324.67**  -0.0087  -11905.24 
Postgrad  -0.0278**  -12848.13  0.0083  -22415.64 
Op_age  -0.0009  -371.8473  0.0010  172.3669 
Fowner  0.0531***  26931.85  0.0072  25720.19 
Gvsales1  0.00003*  0.8224***  0.000005  -59.4829 
Entrophy  -4.5992*  -6557981***  0.1727  2549.184** 
Getgovtpayments  0.0792  -5674.853***  0.0667  -8176.944** 
Totofi  0.00000005***  0.0601  -0.0000003**  -0.0424 
Workofffarm  -0.0148  -5430.336  -0.0280***  7251.504 
Ratioasst  -0.0000004***  -3.0908  0.00001*  -0.1702 
Lakestates  0.3171***  73266.54***  0.0164  733.673 
Cornbelt  0.3879***  111928.2***  0.3483***  92210.74*** 
Nplains  0.1955***  65862.58***  0.1865***  39930.53*** 
Delta  0.2225  39696.24***  0.1643*  25930.24*** 
Mountain  0.2222  74634.88***  0.1765  33635.61*** 
Indexverticalintegration  0.0151  4889.443*  -0.0279  -95701.88* 
Dairyfarm  -0.1336***  -78000.28***  -0.0845***  -81112.64* 
 
          ***=99% significance; **=95% significance; *=90% significance 
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